ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY IN THE CLOUD
ALBERTO G. ARAIZA1

ABSTRACT
Cloud Computing is poised to offer tremendous benefits to
clients, including inexpensive access to seemingly limitless
resources that are available instantly, anywhere. To prepare for
the shift from computing environments dependent on dedicated
hardware to Cloud Computing, the Federal Rules of Discovery
should be amended to provide relevant guidelines and exceptions
for particular types of shared data. Meanwhile, clients should
ensure that service contracts with Cloud providers include
safeguards against inadvertent discoveries and mechanisms for
complying with the Rules. Without these adaptations, clients will
be either reluctant or unprepared to adopt Cloud Computing
services, and forgo their benefits.

INTRODUCTION
The conventional use of personal computers is evolving as shared
computing becomes mainstream.2 A type of shared computing called
“Cloud Computing” stores client data and applications in shared data
centers around the world3 so that clients can access their data or run
applications from any location with an Internet connection.4 A Cloud
provider can offer access to seemingly unlimited applications, operating
systems, and hardware as services of the Cloud.5
¶1

1
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See Chris Weitz, Cloud Computing and the New Normal, COMPUTERWORLD
(Nov. 8, 2010, 1:42 PM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9195468.
3
See Complaint of Electronic Privacy Information Center at 4, In re Google,
Inc. & Cloud Computing Servs. (F.T.C. Mar. 17, 2009) (“[A]pplications reside
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2011

DUKE LAW & TECHNOLOGY REVIEW

No. 008

Cloud Computing is becoming very popular with a broad base of
consumers. Websites such as Facebook turn personal computers into
portals for clients to access and share images, videos, and text online.6 In
December 2010, Google unveiled its Cloud-based notebook, and
commentators noted “there are several things worth raving about. . . . The
machine starts up fast, snaps to life in an instant from sleep mode and has
superb battery life. . . . [A]ll your apps, documents, settings and then some
will be securely housed in the cloud.”7
¶2

Cloud Computing is also becoming popular with businesses and
public organizations. These entities are beginning to use Cloud Computing
because it can reduce the need for IT floor space by 80% and save 60% on
power costs, while tripling usage of IT assets.8 Cloud Computing also
allows clients to penetrate the marketplace with relative ease because it
requires less capital than would be invested in traditional locationdependent hardware.9 It is also sufficiently flexible to adapt to growth and
usage spikes.10 New business models may emerge where using Cloud
Computing is essential to remain competitive in the marketplace.11
¶3

The introduction of Cloud Computing to a variety of industries has
presented new complexities in the discovery phase of litigation. Pretrial
discovery procedures involve delineating the scope of discoverable
electronically stored information (ESI) as potentially leading to relevant
evidence.12 In Cloud Computing, shared data centers housing ESI are
central to discovery. Although the Federal Rules of Discovery (Rules) were
¶4

www.nist.gov/itl/cloud/upload/cloud-def-v15.pdf; see also Jonathan Strickland,
How Cloud Computing Works, HOWSTUFFWORKS,
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Nov. 16, 2010).
6
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7
Edward C. Baig, Google Chromebook: Much to Rave About at First Look,
USA TODAY, http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/edwardbaig/2010-12-16baig16_ST_N.htm?csp=hf (last updated Dec. 16, 2010).
8
Andrew C. DeVore, Cloud Computing: Privacy Storm on the Horizon?, 20
ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 365, 367–68 (2010) (noting the federal government will
push out data dramatically into the Cloud); see also The Benefits of Cloud
Computing: A New Era of Responsiveness, Effectiveness, and Efficiency in IT
Service Delivery, IBM (July 2009),
ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/common/ssi/ecm/en/diw03004usen/DIW03004USEN.
PDF.
9
See Weitz, supra note 2.
10
Id.
11
See, e.g., DeVore, supra note 8, at 368 (“[M]ajor providers [Microsoft and
Google] recognize that this may well be the future of computing, particularly in
the corporate world.”).
12
See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b).
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designed with an inherent flexibility and applicability to technological
developments in personal computing,13 they cannot effectively be adapted
to the Cloud Computing context.
Discovering ESI in a Cloud, where clients share resources, is
complex for two significant reasons. First, Cloud Computing puts client
data under the control of a third-party Cloud provider. Rule 34(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that a party may serve a request to
produce ESI in the responding party’s “possession, custody, or control.”14
These criteria are vague, and as a result of a third party’s control over a
client’s data, key evidence residing in a Cloud may be outside the scope of
discovery. Second, because Cloud Computing services deal with a large
number of clients and may intermingle clients’ resources, isolating or
retrieving the physical storage medium of one client’s data in a lawsuit may
adversely affect other clients who are not involved in the litigation.
¶5

The Rules are not flexible enough to encompass the technological
paradigm shift to Cloud Computing. Specifically, the Rules do not provide
guidelines for the production, preservation, and spoliation of ESI in a shared
environment. This problem may be mitigated through technological means
or by changing the Rules. Further, negotiating the terms of a contractual
relationship between a Cloud provider and client may provide sufficient
protection for both parties. Clients should consider whether their service
contracts include sufficient safeguards against inadvertent discoveries of
data, accurate indications of costs, and mechanisms for complying with the
Rules.
¶6

I. THE FUTURE OF CLOUD COMPUTING
A. Technical Features
The phrase “Cloud Computing,” under which the decentralized
service is marketed, suggests that it is user-friendly and strips away any
semblance of complexity from the minds of consumers.15 The service,
though intangible and novel, is extremely accessible, and the underlying
¶7

13

See FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note.
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
15
See William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1199–1200
(2010) (“This structure closely resembles the early mainframe computing
model; instead of a ‘dumb terminal’ designed solely to access a mainframe’s
resources, the personal computer is beginning to serve as a ‘dumb terminal’ to
access cloud computing’s resources via the Internet.”).
14
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technology of Cloud Computing encompasses several familiar technologies,
collectively deployed in new ways.16
Cloud providers essentially virtualize the same physical resources
(such as processors and storage servers) to service multiple dispersed
clients.17 Cloud providers also divide “the tasks of running applications and
storing data into small chunks,” and then allocate the chunks among various
distributed resources.18 These resources are dynamically partitioned
according to client demand.19 That is, computing resources are divided
according to what clients need, when they need them. Thus, one benefit
includes maximizing access to seemingly limitless computing resources.
¶8

Familiar computer applications are making their way into the
Cloud, arguably increasing the productivity of their users. Early email
services relied on applications residing on storage devices contained in
personal computers, but localized email is increasingly migrating to
webmail.20 Webmail resides in remote data centers shared by clients, and is
accessible from anywhere, over the Internet.21 Productivity software, such
as Microsoft Office, is also shifting into the Cloud.22 Pushing its Office
suite into the Cloud allowed Microsoft to compete with Google Docs,
which was released in 2007 and has always resided in the Cloud. 23
¶9

16

Id.
Tyrone Grandison et al., Towards a Formal Definition of a Computing Cloud,
2010 IEEE 6TH WORLD CONGRESS ON SERVICES 191.
18
See Robison, supra note 15.
19
Mell & Grance, supra note 5, at 1.
20
See George Jiang, Note, Rain or Shine: Fair and Other Non-Infringing Uses
in the Context of Cloud Computing, 36 J. LEGIS. 395, 413 (2010) (“A number of
public cloud applications are already available for tasks such as word
processing, e-mail, video storage and playback, and data storage.”).
21
See Randal C. Picker, Competition and Privacy in Web 2.0 and the Cloud, 103
NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 1, 5 (2008) (“Computing power was first highly
centralized with mainframes, and then decentralized through the switch to
minicomputers and PCs. With the cloud, content and computing power will
increasingly be managed centrally.”).
22
See, e.g., Microsoft Web Apps: Office Goes to the Web, MICROSOFT NEWS
CENTER (Sept. 17, 2009),
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/features/2009/sep09/0917officewebapps.mspx (“Our mission with the upcoming release of Microsoft
Office 2010 is to deliver a great productivity experience . . . . With Office Web
Apps people can access, share and work on Office documents from virtually
anywhere with an Internet connection.”).
23
See Ian Paul, Microsoft Office vs. Google Docs: A Web Apps Showdown,
PCWORLD (Jul. 13, 2009, 9:50 AM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/168309
(“[Microsoft] unveiled as a part of Office 2010 a suite of Microsoft Office Web
apps that will compete directly with Google Docs.”); see also Kevin Cross et al.,
17
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Cloud services make it possible to share resources located
throughout the world.24 For example, Microsoft, Sun Microsystems, and
Google have contemplated placing data centers in Siberia, abandoned
coalmines, and on ships at sea, respectively.25 Interestingly, Google
acquired a patent for placing data centers on ships to obtain power from the
“natural motion of the water” and to use seawater to carry heat away.26
Placing data centers in unusual locations may make Cloud Computing even
more appealing because of the technical benefits of using the natural
environment to power the data centers and to control their temperatures.
¶10

B. Economic Benefits
Analysts predict that 9% of all IT consumer spending will be for
Cloud Computing services by 2012, which reflects a doubling of demand
from 2008.27 Cloud Computing offers businesses lower costs and
accommodates growth with dynamic access to resources and flexible
purchasing plans.28 The cost benefit of outsourcing while maintaining
instant and seemingly unlimited access to computing resources will provide
businesses with a competitive edge.29 Cloud providers, such as Amazon,
Google, and Microsoft, only charge about $0.10 per hour for basic
¶11

Google Docs, WEB 2.0 TOOLS – NEW POSSIBILITIES FOR TEACHING AND
LEARNING (July 8, 2010),
https://wiki.itap.purdue.edu/display/INSITE/Google+Docs#GoogleDocs-what
(“Beginning in February 2007 all Google users had were allowed access to
Google Docs, which has many of the same abilities as MS Word or
Openoffice.org Writer.”).
24
See DeVore, supra note 8 (“[C]ompanies are very interested in having
services that make it easy for workers across the organization and across the
world to use those services collaboratively.”).
25
Murad Ahmed, Google Search Finds Seafaring Solution, THE TIMES, Sept.
15, 2008,
http://technology.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/tech_and_web/the_web/article4753
389.ece; see U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 (filed Feb. 26, 2007).
26
U.S. Patent No. 7,525,207 col.2 l.27–31 (filed Feb. 26, 2007).
27
Frank Gens, IT Cloud Services Forecast – 2008, 2012: A Key Driver of New
Growth, IDC EXCHANGE (Oct. 8, 2008), http://blogs.idc.com/ie/?p=224.
28
See Jiang, supra note 20 (“[C]loud service providers have control over the
content that they make available and can monitor usage statistics. . . . These
attributes provide different access plans, such as the pay-per-use model or an adsupported free access model.”).
29
See DeVore, supra note 8 (“Cloud computing also offers potentially
significant advantages with regard to cost savings and efficiency.”); see also
Weitz, supra note 2 (“Growth of cloud computing adoption is indeed rapid when
the price of entry approaches zero for the smallest subscribers.”).
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processing requests.30 Some analysts predict that these costs will soon
decline by 5% to 20%.31 These benefits allow businesses to “be competitive
and to react faster to the market demands.”32

C. The Legal Implications
Although sharing resources produces positive externalities, it also
gives rise to many legal issues. For example, the data in data centers may
be subject to foreign laws or no laws at all.33 Cloud providers may also
limit the control a business has over data it places in a Cloud.34 These
factors will complicate a client’s effort to defend itself against discovery
requests.
¶12

Attorneys recommend that their clients “have [a] clear
understanding of what [a] cloud provider will do in response to legal
requests for information” and “[n]egotiate roles for response to [electronic]
discovery requests.”35 Clients should “[u]nderstand and negotiate where
[their] data will be stored, what law controls and possible restrictions on
cross-border transfers.”36 Unfortunately, such advice may fail to reach the
¶13

30

Udayan Banerjee, Cloud Economics – A Platform Comparison, UDAYAN
BANERJEE'S BLOG – FROM THE OTHER SIDE (Jan. 21, 2010, 1:12 PM),
http://setandbma.wordpress.com/2010/01/21/cloud-economics-a-platformcomparison.
31
See, e.g., Rachel Lebeaux, What’s Behind Declining Prices for Application
Hosting Services, TOTALCIO (Apr. 3, 2009, 1:45 PM),
http://itknowledgeexchange.techtarget.com/total-cio/what’s-behind-decliningprices-for-application-hosting-services (“[A]nalyst firm Gartner Inc. predicts
that the cost of outsourcing IT infrastructure will decrease 5% to 20% during the
next two years.”).
32
Giuseppe Minutoli et al., Virtual Business Networks with Cloud Computing
and Virtual Machines, INT’L CONF. ON ULTRA MODERN TELECOMM. &
WORKSHOPS, Oct. 2009, at 1, available at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsp?tp=&arnumber=5345440.
33
See Paul T. Jaeger et al., Where is the Cloud? Geography, Economics,
Environment, and Jurisdiction in Cloud Computing, 14 FIRST MONDAY 5
(2009),
http://firstmonday.org/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/viewArticle/24
56/2171 (“The laws of any nation where a data center is located will apply, and
many nations do not have nearly the civil rights safeguards that the United
States does.”).
34
Jiang, supra note 20.
35
Laurin H. Mills, Legal Issues Associated with Cloud Computing, NIXON
PEABODY, 16, 21 (2009),
http://www.secureit.com/resources/Cloud%20Computing%20Mills%20Nixon%
20Peabody%205-09.pdf.
36
Id. at 22.
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masses of inexperienced clients using Cloud services, who do not know
what to anticipate during litigation.

II. AN OVERVIEW OF ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
Electronic discovery is “any process in which electronic data is
sought, located, [and] secured, with the intent of using it as evidence in a
civil or criminal legal case.”37
¶14

A. Electronically Stored Information
The Rules state that “a party must . . . provide to other parties . . . a
copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents,
electronically stored information, and tangible things that are in the
possession, custody, or control of the party and that the disclosing party
may use to support its claims or defenses.”38 A party may request the
production of ESI “in the responding party’s possession, custody, or control
. . . stored in any medium from which information can be obtained.”39 A
party does not have to provide discovery of ESI “from sources that the party
identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost.”40
The use of the phrase “electronically stored information” was “intended to
be broad enough to cover all current types of computer-based information,
and flexible enough to encompass future changes and developments.”41
¶15

B. Discovery of Metadata
Metadata is a type of discoverable ESI.42 Metadata is information
attached to the data it describes, which may include a user name, comments,
document versions, the names of servers storing saved data, and the like.43
Another form of metadata is “tagging, which gives you the ability to
¶16

37

Stephen Biggs & Stilianos Vidalis, Cloud Computing: The Impact on Digital
Forensic Investigations, INT’L CONF. FOR INTERNET TECH. & SECURED
TRANSACTIONS, Nov. 2009, at 2, available at
http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/xpl/freeabs_all.jsp?arnumber=5402561.
38
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(a)(1)(A)(ii).
39
FED. R. CIV. P. 34(a).
40
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2).
41
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note.
42
See Charles R. Ragan et al. eds., The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practice &
Commentary for Managing Information & Records in the Electronic Age,
SEDONA CONF. WORKING GROUP SERIES, 13, 29–30 (Sept. 2005),
http://www.sedonaconference.com/content/miscFiles/TSG9_05.pdf.
43
Find and Remove Metadata (Hidden Information) in Your Legal Documents,
WORD HELP AND HOW-TO, http://office.microsoft.com/en-us/word-help/findand-remove-metadata-hidden-information-in-your-legal-documentsHA001077646.aspx (last visited Feb. 12, 2011).
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identify and reference people in photos, videos and notes.”44 The Rules
state that metadata “may be among the topics discussed in the Rule 26(f)
[pretrial] conference,”45 but the Rules Advisory Committee’s description of
metadata does not offer much guidance for targeting such information
through discovery:
Computer programs may retain draft language, editorial comments,
and other deleted matter (sometimes referred to as “embedded data” or
“embedded edits”) in an electronic file but not make them apparent to
the reader.
Information describing the history, tracking, or
management of an electronic file (sometimes called “metadata”) is
usually not apparent to the reader viewing a hard copy or a screen
image.46

The lack of direction from the Rules is troubling because computer
programs routinely generate metadata and such data may be crucial in
litigation.47 Operating systems “enrich files with metadata” to improve
search and organization capabilities,48 and metadata has already proven to
serve as key evidence in some trials.49
¶17

Although the Rules suggest the production of metadata absent an
affirmative showing of need should be denied,50 federal courts have
attempted to devise frameworks for compelling its production.51 In
¶18

44

Tom Occhino, Tag Friends in Your Status and Posts, THE FACEBOOK BLOG
(Sept. 10, 2009, 3:01 PM),
http://blog.facebook.com/blog.php?post=109765592130.
45
FED. R. CIV. P. 26 advisory committee’s note.
46
See id.
47
See Scott Nagel, Embedded Information in Electronic Documents: Why
Metadata Matters, LAW PRACTICE TODAY (July 2004),
http://www.abanet.org/lpm/lpt/articles/ftr07044.html; see also Damian Vargas,
Note & Comment, Electronic Discovery: 2006 Amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, 34 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 396, 398–99
(2008).
48
Windows Vista metadata, VISION (Jan. 2006),
http://www.lcbridge.nl/vision/vistametadata.htm.
49
See, e.g., Krumwiede v. Brighton Assocs., LLC, No. 05-C-3003, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 31669, at *26–31 (N.D. Ill. May 8, 2006) (entering a default
judgment against a former employee for breach of a restrictive covenant based
on metadata showing the employee had deleted and altered thousands of files).
50
Shannon M. Curreri, Note, Developments in the Law: II. Defining
“Document” in the Digital Landscape of Electronic Discovery, 38 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 1541, 1548 (noting that a prior draft of the advisory committee note quoted
the Manual for Complex Litigation (4th) § 11.446 that “production requests
seeking files with all associated meta data ‘should be conditioned upon a
showing of need or sharing expenses.’”).
51
See, e.g., Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt., 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005).
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Williams v. Sprint/United Management, a federal district judge interpreted
the phrase “[a] party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual
course of business” in Rule 34(b)52 to mean electronic files “with their
metadata intact.”53 It was further ruled that metadata is to be produced even
if it is not explicitly part of a request for production.54
Transient data, including metadata, may constitute discoverable
ESI. For example, in Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Bunnell, the court ruled
that data stored on RAM constitutes ESI.55 The court held that RAM data is
“‘stored’ [information] under the plain meaning of the unambiguous
language of Rule 34.”56 Therefore, even metadata that is temporarily stored
may constitute ESI.
¶19

C. The Duty to Preserve
There is generally no duty to preserve documents, but a
“preservation obligation may arise from many sources, including common
law, statutes, regulations, or a court order . . . in the case.”57 A “litigation
hold” is a notice to a party that triggers the preservation of ESI by requiring
“intervention in the routine operation of an information system” to suspend
the normal destruction of material.58 The duty to preserve may also arise
without notice when litigation is “reasonably anticipated.”59
¶20

Under a good faith requirement, a party is “not permitted to exploit
the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery
obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy
specific stored information that it is required to preserve.”60 Litigants may
separate out ESI (by transferring ESI to another storage device) to comply
with the retention and access requirements of discovery and to avoid
sanctions for spoliation.
¶21

52

FED. R. CIV. P. 34(b).
See Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 653–54.
54
Id.
55
245 F.R.D. 443, 447 (C.D. Cal. 2007); but see Vargas, supra note 47, at 410
(“RAM is not used to store or record data. . . . Data processed in RAM is
constantly overwritten.”).
56
Columbia Pictures, Inc., 245 F.R.D. at 447.
57
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note.
58
Id.
59
See, e.g., Trigon Ins. Co. v. United States, 204 F.R.D. 277, 287 (E.D. Va.
2001) (“[I]f a party has notice (by discovery request, by the provisions of a rule
regarding disclosure, or otherwise) . . . , that party is under a duty not to take
actions that would result in the destruction of the evidence.”).
60
See FED. R. CIV. P. 37(f); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s
note.
53
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D. Spoliation
Spoliation is the deliberate or inadvertent loss, modification, or
destruction of evidence by a party on notice of litigation who failed to take
appropriate steps to preserve data.61 A popular test applied by federal courts
to determine when sanctions for spoliation should apply requires showing
that a spoliator had a duty to preserve, a culpable state of mind, and that the
destroyed evidence was relevant to a party’s claims or defenses.62 The
required level of culpability varies between courts.63 For example, the
Eighth and Tenth Circuits require intentional misconduct or bad faith, but
the Second Circuit held that “neither bad faith nor intentional misconduct is
required.”64 Some scholars claim that imposing sanctions for spoliation is
necessary because failing to preserve evidence not only “prevents a party
from adequately proving or defending a claim at trial” but also “undermines
the efficacy of the adversarial system.”65
¶22

Applying these spoliation tests to Cloud Computing may prove to
be difficult, and therefore must be adapted to this new context. Notably, the
Rules state, “the ordinary operation of computer systems creates a risk that
a party may lose potentially discoverable information without culpable
conduct on its part.”66 Further, “absent exceptional circumstances,
sanctions cannot be imposed for loss of electronically stored information
resulting from the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information
system.”67 Thus, litigants may be unsure how they are supposed to
harmonize the Rules with federal appellate court tests.
¶23

III. DISCOVERY IN THE CLOUD
The Rules require litigants to “discuss any issues about preserving
discoverable information[] and develop a proposed discovery plan” during a
pretrial conference.68 Litigants must discuss discovery issues unique to
Cloud Computing to “reduce prices and resolve potential complications
early in litigation.”69 These requirements create “an affirmative duty on
outside counsel to investigate the document retention policies of their
¶24

61

See Vargas, supra note 47, at 406.
Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 408.
65
James T. Killelea, Note, Spoliation of Evidence: Proposals for New York
State, 70 BROOK. L. REV. 1045, 1046 (2005).
66
FED. R. CIV. P. 37 advisory committee’s note.
67
Id.
68
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(f)(2).
69
See Lauren Katz, Note, Current Development 2008-2009: A Balancing Act:
Ethical Dilemmas in Retaining E-Discovery Consultants, 22 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 929, 934 (2009).
62
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clients during the earliest stages of representation”70 and place “a high
burden of technical knowledge on attorneys.”71
Clients rightfully fear adverse discovery of their ESI.72 For
example, if third parties get access to trade secret information stored in a
Cloud through discovery, “that could destroy the legal protection of trade
secrets.”73 The Rules are “expansive and include[] any type of information
that is stored electronically.”74
¶25

Discovering ESI in the Cloud may also create liabilities for clients
of the Cloud by inadvertently retrieving ESI belonging to other clients. For
example, a sector isolated from a shared storage medium may contain data
from other Cloud clients. This data shared among clients of a Cloud is
discoverable because it is “fixed in a tangible form” and “stored in a
medium from which it can be retrieved and examined.”75 Although major
Cloud providers may include safeguards to ensure security and privacy, an
increasing demand for Cloud services may spawn discount providers
offering fewer safeguards against the unintentional disclosure of other
clients’ data.
¶26

Storing ESI in the Cloud may also provide litigants with loopholes
to avoid divulging certain information. Multiple layers of data are
generated by various clients and managed by Cloud providers, and such ESI
may not be in the possession, custody or control of the litigant.76 The data
layers may include client-specific data, client-specific metadata, and
metadata common to several clients,77 which may be unique to an
application, generated by multiple clients, or stored in a shared repository.78
Common metadata may be maintained in repositories shared between
clients, which makes it a “major problem” to “isolate [that] data and
maintain the security.”79 Therefore, that data may not be in the possession,
¶27

70

Joseph Gallagher, Note, E-Ethics: The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic
Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 20 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 613, 617 (2007).
71
Katz, supra note 69.
72
See Vargas, supra note 47, at 405; see also Mills, supra note 35, at 17.
73
Mills, supra note 35, at 17.
74
FED. R. CIV. P. 34 advisory committee’s note.
75
Id.
76
Bhaskar Prasad Rimal & Mohamed A. El-Refaey, A Framework of Scientific
Workflow Management Systems for Multi-Tenant Cloud Orchestration
Environment, 2010 WORKSHOPS ON ENABLING TECHS.: INFRASTRUCTURE FOR
COLLABORATIVE ENTERPRISES 88, 90 (2010) [hereinafter Multi-Tenant Cloud
Orchestration Environment].
77
Id.
78
See id.
79
Id.
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custody or control of a litigant, and thus not subject to discovery.
Consequently, applying the Rules to a Cloud may create liabilities for
clients of a Cloud and loopholes for litigants.

A. Sharing Resources and Metadata
Inadvertently producing or preserving ESI belonging to other
clients of a Cloud is likely to have significant repercussions. For example,
“in many jurisdictions, inadvertent production of privileged data constitutes
a waiver of privilege.”80 In Marrero-Hernandez v. Esso Standard Oil Co.,
an “errant mouse click” led to the inadvertent production of “approximately
1500 potentially privileged documents” that merged with unprivileged
documents.81 Although the defendant claimed the documents were
privileged,82 the court stated that if parties “opt to use technological
resources to store privileged information, they should also provide the
necessary protection for precisely that information.”83
¶28

Further, allowing parties to discover common metadata in a Cloud
is problematic. The Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co. court held
that “the producing party should produce the electronic documents with
their metadata intact.”84 A party may move for a protective order when
asked to produce metadata if it is “not reasonably accessible” and will result
in “undue burden and cost.”85 However, common metadata may be readily
accessible without undue burden or cost because it is stored in a common
repository, yet its discovery may harm other clients.86 If, however, courts
grant protective orders to protect those other parties, they may incentivize
clients to “hide” their information as common metadata in the Cloud. If
courts do not grant protective orders, then discovery will reveal the common
metadata, possibly disclosing private information about third parties.
¶29

Requiring the production of metadata attached to documents is
particularly troubling because Cloud metadata is increasingly inseparable
among clients.87 Multiple Cloud providers may share metadata in an
¶30

80

Vargas, supra note 47, at 405; see ADAM I. COHEN & DAVID J. LENDER,
ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY: LAW AND PRACTICE 7–21 (2007).
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architecture optimized for interoperability and portability.88 Interoperability
is the ability to exchange and use client data between different Cloud
providers, and portability is the ability to deliver data anywhere on
demand.89 If Cloud providers were forced to change their delivery and
security policies to maintain these two functions, then clients may lose
metadata or lose control over copies of metadata residing in multiple data
centers.90 For example, metadata generated by one Cloud provider may be
inadvertently lost when a client accesses the same metadata through a
second provider.91

B. Preserving Client Data
The duty to preserve ESI under an ongoing litigation hold conflicts
with the “real advantage” of Cloud Computing, which is to increase
“flexibility and responsiveness” of shared resources among clients.92 For
example, Cloud Computing dynamically allocates virtual storage volumes
to clients, which may comprise multiple physical storage volumes
partitioned according to client demand.93 ESI from a single client can
therefore be stored across multiple physical storage volumes, wherever
there is available capacity.94 Thus, preserving (or saving) ESI detracts from
the elasticity of resources for other clients who may have a demand for the
same resources.95
¶31

Implementing preservation techniques may require isolating Cloud
resources, which can cause performance degradation for other clients
because they are forbidden access to the same resources.96 Further, a Cloud
provider may isolate physical resources, rather than virtual ones, to ensure
full compliance with the Rules. Isolating a physical resource may preserve
data belonging to multiple clients who share that same physical resource;
the data may have otherwise been routinely deleted at the request of clients
who are not parties to a litigation hold. The subsequent release of the
physical resource from the litigation hold may frustrate the routine business
operations of other clients because their data will remain preserved. These
problems are further complicated when multiple Cloud providers service the
same clients.
¶32
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C. Identifying Who Controls Data
The Rules require that a client produce ESI in its possession,
custody, or control. In Cloud Computing, it is a client’s “control” that is
most difficult to define because Cloud providers are custodians of the ESI
they hold in data centers.97 A client is deemed to have control over ESI “so
long as the party has the legal right or ability to obtain the documents from
another source upon demand.”98 Thus, clients may not have legal or actual
control over common metadata that serves as key evidence.99
¶33

The requirements imposed on Cloud providers under the Rules are
ambiguous at best. The Stored Communications Act (SCA) provides
safeguards for clients against compelled disclosures imposed on Cloud
providers.100 A client, however, will only benefit from the SCA “when a
cloud provider expressly limits its access” to client data “for the purposes of
providing computer storage or processing functions.”101 Inexperienced
clients who allow Cloud providers access to their data “without specifying
the limits of that authority” are generally not protected by the SCA.102 For
example, clients of Gmail are probably not protected because Google
reviews emails to provide client-specific contextual advertising.103 More
generally, Cloud Computing clients may be disqualified from “seeking
refuge from disclosure under the Act” when Cloud providers use a “service
of retrieval” function “for using applications or data stored with the cloud
provider” because this function permits Cloud providers to access client
data content.104
¶34
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D. Increased Legal Risks
Cloud Computing poses new challenges for litigants to avoid
sanctions.105 The inadvertent deletion of ESI, under a litigation hold, by a
routine operation of a Cloud provider or through actions from clients of the
same provider may result in spoliation claims.106 It is unclear if the safe
harbor provision107 of the Rules will apply when clients share operations of
computer systems. Even basic litigation holds may impose undue burdens
and costs on a litigant or on multiple clients of a Cloud not associated with
the matter.
¶35

IV. SOLUTIONS FOR DISCOVERY IN THE CLOUD
A. Contractual Relationships
One key to mitigating risks associated with discovery in a Cloud is
negotiating the terms of a service contract to define the legal rights of a
provider and client. Of course, this solution assumes equal bargaining
power between a Cloud provider and client.108 While powerful entities may
successfully negotiate favorable terms of a contract, smaller or
inexperienced clients may be subject to one-sided agreements.109 For
example, the city of Los Angeles negotiated a contract with Google to
provide an email system for city employees.110 The contract included
¶36

for purposes of providing any services other than storage or computer
processing.’”) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(2) (2006)).
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1193 (D. Utah 2009) (finding sanctions were appropriate because the
defendant’s “system architecture of questionable reliability which has evolved
rather than been planned, operates to deny . . . access to evidence”); see also
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, 220 F.R.D. 212, 215, 222 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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provisions where Google would “compensate the city in the event that the
Google system was breached and city data exposed or stolen.”111 In
contrast, the standard Gmail service contract with individual customers
allows Google to access client information and email; it also notes that
Google “processes personal information” on servers in the U.S. and in other
countries.112
Clients should also be cautious about using the services of smaller,
less-expensive, competing Cloud providers who might lack the resources to
properly accommodate discovery requests. However, clients may have
more bargaining power with smaller Cloud providers. Still, clients ought to
be aware that the providers will probably offer fewer reliable service
features.
¶37

A service contract should provide safeguards to protect clients from
the inadvertent discovery of ESI and include procedural guidelines to
facilitate the discovery process. Provisions should delineate the types and
amount of metadata routinely preserved in a designated repository and
define client rights to access that metadata. Provisions should ensure that
clients remain protected under the SCA by preventing Cloud providers from
unilaterally accessing, viewing, or providing client ESI to government
agencies or other parties.113 A contract should, at least, require Cloud
providers to notify clients in advance of accessing client ESI, which would
allow clients time to secure privileged information.114 The contract should
also impose restrictions on the location of data centers storing client ESI
because the laws in some countries may trump U.S. security and privacy
provisions.115
¶38

B. Technical Solutions
In addition to negotiating the terms of Cloud Computing services,
there are several possible technical solutions. First, a client may adopt a
hybrid approach to storing data by which the majority of data is stored in a
public Cloud and sensitive ESI is stored in a private Cloud.116 Of course,
¶39
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this requires private infrastructure and remains limited to clients with
greater financial resources. A hybrid approach may also require redundant
applications stored in different types of Clouds or require indexing and
channeling of sensitive metadata into a private Cloud.
Second, Cloud providers may consider developing an application
that automatically isolates specified ESI and associated metadata when
there is a litigation hold. Cloud providers may then offer the application as
an added service to clients. A client may try to avoid sanctions by using
this software program because its use demonstrates a good faith attempt to
comply with the Rules.
¶40

Third, Cloud providers may track metadata, especially when
considering the possibility of replicating, moving, or losing metadata as
clients migrate between Clouds to access ESI from remote locations, and
through different devices.
¶41

Finally, another solution may be to encrypt all ESI and metadata
with client-specific keys such that the ESI, and metadata, remain
indecipherable by other clients in case of an inadvertent production.
¶42

C. Revising the Rules
While negotiated contracts and technical changes may help
individual clients, a universal solution requires amending the Rules. The
test for “possession, custody, or control”117 in the Rules requires a
clarification of what degree of control distinguishes data subject to
discovery in a shared environment. “Control” should be limited to ESI,
including metadata, over which a party has exclusive or substantial control.
If “control” is not given such a circumscribed meaning, exceptions to the
current liberal definition should exist to avoid the inadvertent production or
destruction of ESI shared with other parties. Further, the Rules should not
allow discovery of physical storage volumes in a shared environment, or
they should limit discovery only to virtual volumes. If physical storage
volumes remain discoverable, then Cloud providers should be required to
provide fair notice to clients who may share the same resources.
¶43

The Rules should provide better guidelines for distinguishing
different types of ESI (e.g., user-specific and common metadata) and define
the scope of production and preservation owed by parties in a Cloud. The
Rules should consider that clients may have limited control over key ESI
and that Cloud providers control common metadata. Furthermore,
safeguards to prevent the risk of inadvertently preserving ESI belonging to
other Cloud clients should be addressed by the Rules. That is, they should
provide for more procedural mechanisms than the mere ability to move for a
¶44
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protective order when clients are asked to produce metadata that is not
reasonably accessible or results in undue burden and cost. There should be
exceptions for reasonably accessible shared metadata that may unduly
burden other clients.

D. Immediate Measures
Until the above remedies become commonplace and the Rules are
amended, Cloud providers should devise procedural and usage guidelines to
protect clients. The guidelines should aid clients to demonstrate a good
faith effort to comply with the Rules and facilitate the discovery process.
They should provide safeguards for clients and mitigate risks of sanctions
by preventing the destruction of ESI after a litigation hold issues. To avoid
claims of spoliation, a Cloud provider should provide a mechanism for
gathering data fragmented across multiple data centers, isolating relevant
data, and migrating that data to a repository where it will remain intact.
Cloud providers should understand their roles as custodians of ESI they
possess and outline instructions for their staff to respond to litigation holds.
¶45

V. CONCLUSION
The Federal Rules of Discovery do not effectively apply to clients
of a Cloud. The shared nature of Cloud Computing requires limiting
discovery to data in exclusive or substantial control by a client or whose
discovery will not unduly harm other clients. In anticipation of the
universal adoption of Cloud Computing, the Rules should provide guidance
and exceptions for particular types of shared ESI. Meanwhile, clients
should consider whether their service contracts include safeguards against
inadvertent discoveries of data, indicate the costs for ongoing preservation,
and provide mechanisms for complying with the duty to preserve and for
securely applying and releasing litigation holds.118 Inaction will stifle the
adoption of Cloud Computing and deny the public its positive network
effects.
¶46
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